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Abstract
In order for autonomic systems to function, the individual components must co-
operate and not indulge in malicious behavior. However, it is almost certain that au-
tonomous systems in Next Generation Networks will inadvertently include less than
trustworthy components. Identifying such entities is critical to the smooth and effec-
tive functioning. We present new experiments conducted with the ROCQ scheme,
a reputation-based trust management system that computes the trustworthiness of
peers on the basis of transaction-based feedback. The ROCQ model combines four
parameters: Reputation (R) or a peer’s global trust rating, Opinion (O) formed by
a peer’s first-hand interactions, Credibility (C) of a reporting peer and Quality (Q)
or the confidence a reporting peer puts on the feedback it provides. In this paper,
we demonstrate that ROCQ is robust against churn and also examine the effect of
credibility and quality on the performance of the scheme.

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1 Introduction
Autonomous systems attempt to monitor their own behavior (self-aware) and react to mal-
functioning components or modules in an automated fashion (self-healing). This paper
explores ideas of trust management that have been developed in other contexts such as
e-commerce and peer-to-peer systems and applies them for the soft enforcement of rules
of behavior in specific autonomous systems.
A substantial body of work has emerged in recent years on trust management in electronic
communities. The fundamental concept behind most of this work is to study the past
interactions of a user and estimate his or her trustworthiness on this basis. These systems
allow users to rate transactions they have had with other users. These ratings are then
aggregated to form a global trust metric which is used to calculate the trustworthiness of
a user.
Initial trust management systems were based on centralized trust databases. The eBay
rating system, the Amazon customer review system and the Slashdot self-moderation
of posts [1] are all systems where the ratings are provided by peers but are stored in
a central database. Many such reputation systems have been studied in the context of
online communities and marketplaces [2–4].
More recently, schemes with decentralized trust databases have emerged, particularly in
the context of peer-to-peer networks. Examples of such systems include Aberer et al.’s
scheme based on P-Grid [5], Cornelli et al.’s mechanism built on Gnutella [6, 7], the
EigenTrust system proposed by Kamvar et. al. [8], PeerTrust by Xiong et. al. [9].
In this paper we examine the ROCQ scheme (pronounced “rock”) that computes peer
Reputations (R) on the basis of Opinion (O), Credibility (C) and Quality (Q). This scheme
was introduced in [10], where results from initial experiments that studied the feasibility
and effectiveness of ROCQ were presented. In this work, we extend these results by
studying new scenarios. In particular, we study the impact of churn – the continuous
process of node arrivals and departures – and of credibility and quality on ROCQ.
The ROCQ model is summarized in Section 2 followed by a description of the system
architecture that builds on top of a structured P2P network to provide decentralized trust
storage, aggregation and dissemination. Also in Section 3 we discuss security consid-
erations for ROCQ. In Section 4 we describe a series of simulation-based experiments
designed to evaluate the performance of ROCQ in a variety of settings.
2 The ROCQ Model
2.1 Opinion
A peer forms an opinion about the amount of satisfaction it has derived from a transaction
that it takes part in. The term 	 refers to peer 
 ’s opinion about its  transaction with
peer  and is normalized to take values in  . A peer may also choose to keep a record
of its own first-hand experiences in the form of averaged opinions.
Hence, ﬀﬀﬁ	 is peer 
 ’s estimate of the average amount of satisfaction it has received from
peer  and is computed as follows:
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where
+
	 is the number of interactions it has had with  .
2.2 Reputation
The reputation of a peer 
 is the end result of aggregating feedback about 
 from several
other peers. It represents the global system-wide view of the average amount of satisfac-
tion a peer is likely to derive through an interaction with 
 . The reputation of a peer is also
normalized so that it lies between  and  .
The reputation of a peer  is computed at the peer , using reported opinions, the quality
value sent by reporting peers and the credibility of reporting peers as follows:
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where
-/.
 is the aggregated reputation of peer  , 2
.
 is the credibility of peer 
 according
to peer , , ﬀﬂﬁ	 is the average opinion of  reported by 
 and 4 ﬃ is the associated quality
value reported by 
 . Thus peer , gives more weight to ratings that are considered to be
of a high quality and that come from peers who are more credible in its eyes.
2.3 Credibility
In ROCQ, the credibility of a peer is used to weigh the feedback it reports. If a peer gives
wrong feedback about other peers its credibility rating is decreased and its subsequent
reports have a reduced impact on the reputation of another peer. Similarly, if a peer’s
feedback is consistently good, i.e., in agreement with other reporting peers, its credibility
rating goes up. Credibility ratings are based on first-hand experience only and, unlike
opinions, they are not shared with other peers. Credibility ratings are normalized so that
they lie between  and  .
When a peer reports an opinion to another peer for the first time, its credibility is set to
687 . Thereafter, on the :9;< report to peer , , the credibility of peer 
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otherwise. 2 .  is the credibility of peer 
 after  reports to peer , ,  ﬂﬀﬁﬃ is the opinion
being currently reported by peer 
 , 4 	 is the associated quality value,
-M.
 is the aggre-
gated reputation value that peer , computed for  and I
.
 is the standard deviation of all
the reported opinions about peer  .
2.4 Quality
ROCQ allows a peer to determine the confidence of its feedback. Giving incorrect feed-
back can decrease the credibility of a peer. So, a peer can lower the quality value for
opinions about which it is not very sure, therefore risking less loss of credibility in case
its judgment is incorrect. Quality is also normalized to lie between  and  .
We assume that the amount of satisfaction provided during each transaction by peer 
is a normally distributed random variable. Through interactions with  , peer 
 makes
observations of this random variable resulting in a sample. The sample mean and standard
deviation are then  ﬀﬀﬁ	 and I 	 .
The quality value of the opinion ( 4 	 ) is defined as the confidence level that the actual
mean trust rating for a peer lies within the confidence interval:
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where
P
is a system parameter that denotes the size of the confidence interval as a per-
centage of the sample mean. Further details on how quality values are computed can be
found in [10].
3 System Architecture
While the ROCQ trust model is independent of the underlying architecture, its effective-
ness clearly depends on the system architecture and the ROCQ implementation. Since
there is no centralized database, any implementation needs to collect, store and dissem-
inate reputation information in a distributed way. Moreover, this should be done in a
scalable, efficient and cost-effective manner.
Our implementation of ROCQ assumes a structured overlay network that provides a se-
cure, deterministic and reliable way to route messages. These networks use Distributed
Hash Tables (DHT) to map objects to a keyspace. Nodes in the network are then respon-
sible for certain ranges of the keyspace. The underlying DHT overlay structure randomly
and uniformly designates R score managers for each peer in the network. A score man-
ager for a peer is another peer in the network that stores all trust information related to
that peer. All feedback pertaining to that peer and requests for the reputation of that peer
are routed to the score manager.
When a peer wishes to interact with another peer, it retrieves the reputation values for
that peer from its score managers. These are then aggregated using the furnished quality
values and the credibility values for the score managers since a score manager itself may
be malicious and send the wrong reputation values. The final average reputation value
– formed by two aggregations, first at the score managers and second at the requesting
peer – is then used to decide whether the transaction should proceed. It is computed as
follows:
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where
-
S
 is a reputation value received from a score manager U about peer  .
If a peer has had interactions with the prospective partner before, it may have already
formed an opinion value for this peer. In this case, the peer may wish to prefer its own
first-hand experience to the information being provided by the trust management system
or to use a combination of the global reputation and its first hand experience.
3.1 Security Considerations
Let us now briefly discuss the security problems that arise in the context of ROCQ. The
ROCQ reputation mechanism cannot prevent all kinds of attacks that malicious entities
can inflict on autonomous system. ROCQ is a soft mechanism that attempts to enforce
good behavior in the network through incentives. Hence attacks on the integrity of the
underlying network, such as mis-routing messages or a single user presenting multiple
identities to subvert the system are out of the scope of ROCQ. We describe some of these
attacks and solutions that have been presented in the literature.
Autonomous systems usually create an overlay network for communication between the
constituents. These overlay networks require collaboration among users to forward mes-
sages and to update routing tables in a consistent manner. Malicious entities can dis-
seminate false routing updates in the network and they can falsify information about the
location or status of a resource as so to keep control on the resource.
However, failure in message delivery can be caused either by topology changes due to the
dynamic nature of such networks or by a compromised node. As a result, it is not trivial
to distinguish between benign and malign failures. And because the operability of such
networks depends on the nodes’ willingness to forward messages, a compromised node
will affect more than just the interactions it is part of. Failure tests or redundant [11] and
iterative routing [12] can be used to detect faults and to provide alternative routes around
the failed node. But this results in a cost increase since multiple paths need to be stored
and updated.
Other possible attacks on autonomous systems include denying the existence of data the
node is responsible for and repudiating transactions. The first type of attack can be
avoided by carefully replicating the object at different locations not under the control
of the same node. This approach can be beneficial when the data stored can be tampered
or mislabeled. However, such a replication scheme will not be effective when a node can
assume multiple identities. This attack, known as Sybil attack [13], can severely com-
promise an autonomous network, since malicious nodes can counterfeit identities with
different reputation values and control different object in the system. This eliminates any
benefit that could have been obtained from a reputation management scheme, from repli-
cating data or from using alternative paths for routing. In [13], Douceur suggests using
a trusted identification authority that is in charge of establishing node identifiers. In [12]
certified nodeIDs are proposed; this requires each entities to own a certificate (valid pub-
lic/private keys) and binds the nodeID to a specific IP address. This has several drawbacks
since node mobility or changes in the network can cause the node’s IP address to change
requiring re-certification or the assumption of a new identity. Furthermore, the solution
does not work for nodes behind a NAT.
The presence of a certification authority allows a public key infrastructure to function,
which in turn allows for encryption of messages and signing of feedback messages. This
ensures the integrity of trust query, reply and feedback messages in transit. Furthermore,
a peer cannot repudiate a message once it has been sent and recipients are able to verify
the identity of the sender and the authenticity of the message.
4 Experimental Results
Preliminary experimental results of ROCQ were presented in [10]. The new results we
present below focus on the performance of ROCQ under churn and the impact of quality
and credibility.
4.1 Methodology
For our experiments, we use FreePastry [14], an open-source implementation of Pastry
that is written in Java. We used FreePastry to create a virtual P2P network and to deliver
messages between peers. ROCQ is implemented as an application that runs on top of
individual Pastry nodes.
Number of Peers and Interactions. Unless stated otherwise, each experiment simulates
a network with
E
V peers where 7QVVQ transactions take place. Both participants of each
interaction are chosen randomly. The default number of score managers storing reputation
ratings for each peer is W . Each experiment was performed 3 times and the average of
the results is plotted, along with a confidence interval of size XY
([Z
where I is the standard
deviation.
Performance Metric. The performance is measured as the number of correct decisions
made (i.e., interactions with good peers that went ahead plus interactions with malicious
peers that were avoided) as a proportion of the total number of decisions made. Only
decisions made by good peers were counted.
Type of Maliciousness. We simulate two different kinds of maliciousness. A peer can be
malicious in the base system, i.e., behave maliciously when interacting with other peers
and/or it may be malicious in the reputation system sending incorrect reputation values to
requesting peers.
4.2 Comparison with the Aberer-Despotovic Scheme
In this experiment we compare the performance of the ROCQ scheme with the trust man-
agement scheme proposed by Aberer and Despotovic in [5].
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Figure 1: Comparison of the RQC Scheme with the Aberer-Despotovic Scheme with
Malicious in the Base System Only
Aberer and Despotovic proposed two schemes, the simple and the complex. In the simple
scheme, peers give equal weight to all reporting peers. In the complex scheme, only
reports from peers that exceed a given trust threshold are taken into account.
Figure 1 compares the performance of the two schemes when there is maliciousness in the
base system only whereas Fig. 2 compares the performance when there is maliciousness in
both the base and the reputation system. ROCQ outperforms both the simple and complex
the Aberer-Despotovic algorithms in all cases except when the proportion of malicious
peers is higher than 7Q]\ in Fig. 1. In this case, the dominant ethic of the system is that of
the malicious peers.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the RQC Scheme with the Aberer-Despotovic Scheme with
Maliciousness in both Base and Reputation Systems
4.3 The Impact of Churn in the Network
In this experiment we measure the impact of churn - the continuous process of peers
joining and leaving the network - on the performance of ROCQ. This experiment was
performed with ^V]\ malicious peers in the base system only. The straight line indicates
the performance of ROCQ with no churn. The x-axis indicates, on a logarithmic scale,
average peer lifetime in terms of number of transactions the peer participates in. As the
average peer life time increases, the amount of churn in the network increases.
Note that an average lifetime of two transactions does not necessarily mean that each peer
leaves the network after two transactions. Peers join and leave the network at random
and several peers may leave the network without participating in any transaction. On
the other hand, several peers may remain in the network for a substantial duration of the
experiment. For instance, in our tests with an average peer lifetime of Q6_7 transactions, the
longest lived peers took part in up to
E
 transactions. Moreover, we do not count initial
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Figure 3: Impact of Churn on ROCQ with Maliciousness in the Base System Only
transactions – defined as transactions with a peer never seen before – when measuring
the performance of ROCQ. When the average peer lifetime is small, the number of initial
transactions is considerably higher, thus excluding them from the performance statistics.
As we can see in Fig. 3, ROCQ performance remains unchanged over a wide range of
churn rates. From this result, we can infer that the ROCQ trust model and system archi-
tecture are very resilient to churn. The system preserves enough redundancy that node
departures do not result in a loss of trust information and at the same time, new arrivals
are gracefully integrated into the trust management system.
4.4 Impact of Confidence and Quality
In this experiment we turn our attention to the effect quality and credibility have on
ROCQ. Recall that the variable credibility represents a peer’s honesty in the reputation
system whereas quality is the importance a peer attaches to feedback it sends. In this
experiment we examine the cases when (1) Both credibility and quality values are used,
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Figure 4: Impact of Credibility and Quality on ROCQ with Maliciousness in the Base
System Only
(2) Only credibility values are used, (3) Only quality values are used and (4) Neither
credibility nor quality values are used to compute peer reputations.
Figure 4 shows that furnishing credibility and quality values does not have much impact
on the performance of ROCQ when there is maliciousness in the base system only. This
is to be expected as when peers are malicious in the base system only, they do not give
incorrect recommendations and hence full confidence can be placed in all recommenda-
tions.
On the other hand, Fig. 5 shows the performance of ROCQ when there is maliciousness
in the reputation system only. Here, the absence of credibility and quality values reduces
the performance of ROCQ by up to ^VV\ . Moreover, of the three poorly performing cases,
not using quality values performs marginally better. This shows that credibility is the
more important of the two variables. It is clear from Fig. 5 that quality and credibility
are critical to the performance of ROCQ and opinion, quality and credibility should all be
taken into account to accurately measure the reputation of a peer.
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Figure 5: Impact of Credibility and Quality on ROCQ with Maliciousness in the Reputa-
tion System Only
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented new experimental results with ROCQ, a reputation-based
trust management system. The experiments demonstrate that ROCQ is resilient to node
churn over a variety of churn rates. In addition, we examine the impact of credibility
and quality on the performance of ROCQ. We introduced the concepts of credibility and
quality in [10] as part of the ROCQ algorithm. We now demonstrate that these variables
add value to the ROCQ algorithm and without them ROCQ performance decreases by up
to ^VV\ . Finally, we discuss the security requirements and implications of a scheme like
ROCQ. Preventing certain kinds of attacks, especially those that target the integrity of the
underlying network, is beyond the scope of ROCQ.
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